The process of making judgments and decisions requires a method for combining data. To compare the accuracy of clinical and mechanical (formal, statistical) data-combination techniques, we performed a meta-analysis on studies of human health and behavior. On average, mechanical-prediction techniques were about 10% more accurate than clinical predictions. Depending on the specific analysis, mechanical prediction substantially outperformed clinical prediction in 33%-47% of studies examined. Although clinical predictions were often as accurate as mechanical predictions, in only a few studies (6%-16%) were they substantially more accurate. Superiority for mechanical-prediction techniques was consistent, regardless of the judgment task, type of judges, judges' amounts of experience, or the types of data being combined. Clinical predictions performed relatively less well when predictors included clinical interview data. These data indicate that mechanical predictions of human behaviors are equal or superior to clinical prediction methods for a wide range of circumstances.
Two general classes of data combination procedures have been extensively studied in the psychological and medical literatures: clinical judgment and mechanical prediction. Clinical judgment refers to the typical procedure long used by applied psychologists and physicians, in which the judge puts data together using informal, subjective methods. Clinicians differ in how they do this: The very nature of the process tends to preclude precise specification.
Mechanical prediction, including statistical prediction (using explicit equations), actuarial prediction (as with insurance companies' actuarial tables), and what we may call algorithmic prediction (e.g., a computer program emulating expert judges), is by contrast well specified. Once developed, application of mechanical prediction requires no expert judgment. Also, mechanical predictions are 100% reproducible.
Clinical and mechanical predictions sometimes disagree (Meehl, 1986) . One cannot both admit and not admit a college applicant, or parole and imprison a convict. To fail to grapple with the question-Which prediction should one follow?-is to ignore the obligation of beneficence. Hence, the comparison of clinical judgment and mechanical prediction takes on great importance. Meehl's (1954) famous review of clinical versus statistical prediction inspired many psychologists to conduct studies on this We thank Roger Blashfield for providing a citation search of references to Meehl's (1954) topic. Sawyer's (1966) later review included 40 studies addressing mechanical versus clinical data combination. He concluded that mechanical prediction often outshines clinical prediction; that is, when it is not superior, it performs as well as clinical prediction. Since then, several reviews and polemics have appeared (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Garb, 1994; Holt, 1970; Marchese, 1992; Sines, 1971; Wiggins, 1981) .
We report the results of the first completed meta-analysis to be conducted on studies comparing clinical and mechanical prediction. Except for Holt (1970) , the previous reviews of this area have reached largely similar conclusions, favoring statistical prediction. So why bother to resurvey the field? Because, as Holt pointed out, the older reviews were flawed by problems like low statistical power, subjective decisions about superiority of one method versus another, and failure to examine study-design variables when summarizing the literature. The present study avoided many of these problems by analyzing far more studies than have been included in previous reviews (thus improving statistical power) and by applying quantitative meta-analytic techniques (Cooper & Hedges, 1994; Hedges & Olkin, 1985; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Smith, Glass, & Miller, 1980) as opposed to a subjective literature review.
As we apply it, meta-analysis yields two encoded sets of measurements for each comparison of clinical and mechanical prediction. First, study-design characteristics that might influence the study's outcome are encoded. Second, there is an objectively defined effect size (ES). Each ES quantifies the degree to which mechanical prediction out-or underperforms clinical prediction. Thus, we are able to provide a quantitative analysis of the relative superiority of clinical and statistical predictions, and to determine the extent to which these differences are influenced by studydesign characteristics.
Method

Finding Studies
Our search for studies began by reviewing reference lists of previous reviews and an additional list of studies provided by Paul E. Meehl. We 19 then ran keyword searches using PsycLit and MedLine. These searches covered the years 1966-1988 for the key words actuarial, algorithm, artificial intelligence, Bayesian, clinical, clinician, computer-aided diagnosis, computer-assisted diagnosis, inference, judgment, physician, practitioner, prediction, psychologist, psychotherapist, psychiatrist, psychodi- agnosis, and statistical. We also ran computer searches for citations of articles by Holt (1958 Holt ( , 1970 , Sarbin (1942) , Meehl (1954) , Sawyer (1966) , Sines (1971) , and any publication by De Dombal. These are prominent summaries of the literature (i.e., authors Meehl, Sarbin, Sawyer, and Sines) or articles by leading investigators (i.e., authors De Dombal and Holt). These searches were supplemented by a hand search for articles published during 1945-1994 in many journals that had published relevant articles (list available on request). We also contacted prominent researchers in the field, asking for articles. Finally, we checked references in studies found by any of these means. Our search procedure is comprehensive, and it appears unlikely that we missed many studies.
Criteria for Including Studies
To be included, clinicians and mechanical procedures had to predict human behavior, make psychological or medical diagnoses or prognoses, or assess states and traits (including abnormal behavior and normal personality). Only studies within the realm of psychology and medicine were included. Thus, we excluded attempts to predict nonhuman outcomes (e.g., horse races, weather, stock market prices).
Studies also had to meet several additional inclusion criteria. First, studies had to compare the performance of at least one human judge to at least one mechanical-prediction scheme. The latter included explicit mathematical formulas, actuarial tables, and other algorithmic procedures (e.g., a computer model of a human judge). Second, the clinician and the mechanical procedure had to have access to the same (or almost the same) predictor variables and predict a common criterion. Operationally, we excluded studies where the predictor variables used by one method were not a subset of those used by the other.
Studies were excluded if they operated on different sets of participants, unless the assignment of participants to prediction conditions was random.
This was to rule out the possibility that an ostensibly superior prediction method was favored by being applied to participants for whom predictions were easier to make. Using tfiese selection criteria, 163 studies were identified. Of the 163 studies, 136 qualified for inclusion once closely examined for coding.
Coding Studies
A 25-page manual (available on request) was used to code each study for publication variables and study-design characteristics. Publication variables included year of publication and publication source (e.g., journal
article, dissertation, etc.). In regard to design characteristics, the nature of the criterion variable was coded and subcategorized where appropriate. Predictors were coded into major categories (e.g., personality test data), then subcategorized (e.g., objective or projective). Clinician characteristics included professional identification (e.g., physician or psychologist), amount of education, extent of general post-education experience, and amount of experience with the specific prediction task. The form of prediction task was coded (e.g., were judges asked to assign patients to categories, or were they asked to make rank ratings?). We coded the type of mechanical scheme (e.g., regression analysis, actuarial table), and crossvalidation used (e.g., none, split sample, bootstrapping, or jackknifing; Efron, 1982) , We coded whether clinicians, the mechanical method, or neither had more information on which to base predictions.
The 25-page manual was also used to code each study for the accuracy of clinical and mechanical predictions. We coded variables directly related to ES computation and weighting: number of subjects, number of judges, and number of judgments per judge per subject; and the number of subjects given mechanical predictions. Finally, we coded the accuracy of clinical and mechanical predictions and identified the type of accuracy statistic (e.g., hit rate, correlation).
In many studies, more than one clinical or mechanical prediction was reported. For example, predictions might be made for more than one criterion (e.g., college GPA and college leadership ratings). In such a case, as a first step the different predictands were separately coded. Also, in many studies, several clinicians or several mechanical-prediction algorithms made judgments. For example, accuracy for experienced versus novice judges might be reported, or the efficiency of unweighted sums of predictor variables might be compared with a linear regression equation.
All possible paired clinical-mechanical prediction comparisons were calculated.
One study (Goldberg, 1965) was voluminous, yielding 124 ESs. To ensure that Goldberg's results did not overwhelm those from other studies, and to reduce the multiplicity of results from other studies, we conducted a study effect-size analysis (explained below).
Reliability
After initial training, a series of 14 studies (31 ESs) were coded by a minimum of two coders each to check reliability. These studies had not been used in training. Reliability of ES coding was satisfactory (intraclass R = .97). The rest of the studies were coded by only one rater. Coding problems were resolved by consensus.
Study Effect Sizes
In our primary data analyses, we reduced the data to one representative ES per study. This approach prevents potential biases arising from the inclusion of studies with multiple, nonindependent ESs. To select the most representative ES, we proceeded as follows: We took as representative of the clinicians' performance for the study the performance of that judge (or group of judges) that would be expected to have the highest accuracy (or no lower accuracy than any other judge). Thus, we preferred clinicians with the most experience with the particular prediction task at hand; failing this, we preferred clinicians with the most general clinical experience; as a fallback, we took clinicians with the most training. If the study did not describe the experience or training of the judges well enough to make such distinctions, then we took the median of all judges. Among the various mechanical-prediction schemes used in a study, we preferred crossvalidated rules to ones that were not; among cross-validated rules, we took the one with the highest accuracy.' If there were no cross-validated rules, then we took the median performance of all actuarial prediction rules. In other words, the clinicians we would expect a priori to perform best (or as well as any others) on a new sample were compared with the mechanicalprediction scheme we would expect to perform best (or as well as any other) on a new sample. We acknowledged that the procedures utilized to select the most representative ES might bias the results. We, therefore, also analyzed the data in several ways: utilizing the median ES for each study, examining every ES from every study, and also looking at the data using different criteria for selecting the most representative ES.
Transformation of ESs
Studies assessed prediction accuracy in incommensurable ways, therefore we converted accuracy measures to a common metric. First, we found a suitable transformation of the reported accuracy statistic (e.g., hit rate, correlation, etc.) with a known asymptotic variance and an approximately normal distribution (Rao, 1973) . We then computed the transformed ES as 1 We treated N ^ 1000 studies as if they were cross-validated, because there is little validity shrinkage with such large samples.
the difference between mechanical and clinical predictions' transformed accuracy statistics. Positive ESs indicate superiority for mechanical prediction.
Weighted least squares were used to compute descriptive and inferential statistics (Draper & Smith, 1981) . The weight for a transformed ES was chosen to be inversely proportional to the square root of the asymptotic variance for that transformed ES. For example, suppose a study reported hit rates as its accuracy statistic. Because a suitable variance-stabilizing transform for a hit rate (proportion) is the arcsin transformation (Rao, 1973) , the transformed ES would be ES = (sin" 1 Vpm -sin" 1 Vpc), where />", and
Pe are proportions of accurate predictions for mechanical and clinical prediction, respectively. The asymptotic variance of a single transformed proportion is 1/(4A^, therefore our ES, being the difference between two independent, transformed proportions, has asymptotic variance, [1/(4JV) + 1/(4AO] = 1/(2JV). The weight, given such an ES when aggregating ESs to produce descriptive or inferential statistics, is then chosen to be proportional to V2M In parallel fashion, correlations were transformed by Fisher's z transform; differences between two independent rs have asymptotic variance, 2/N (Rao, 1973) . Other accuracy statistics reported in some studies (e.g., area under a receiver operating characteristic [ROC] curve) could all be transformed into either a hit rate or a correlation, which was then transformed and weighted as described.
Nonindependence of Statistics
Accuracy statistics for clinical and mechanical prediction from a single study are usually nonindependent, because they are generally evaluated on the same participants. This creates a statistical problem, compounded by the fact that a study ES, which is the median of several highly correlated individual ESs, has a smaller asymptotic variance than the median of several uncorrelated ESs. Lacking necessary information to compensate for nonindependence of statistics, we had to ignore it. 2 This results in overestimation of the sampling error of the ES, which is most notable with studies having close agreement between clinical and mechanical predictions. It does not introduce a predictable, systematic bias to the comparisons.
Data Analysis
We report the entire ES distribution and provide histograms and summary statistics for the distribution. Also, we report the number of studies that exceed 0.1 in the transformed ES scale. This is a way to describe how many ESs show pragmatically useful superiority for clinical or mechanical prediction. A 0.1 ES difference corresponds with about a 9%-10% difference in hit rates, for predictions of intermediate (50%-75%) accuracy.
Results Table 1 We tested whether the ESs are homogeneous by QT statistic (Hedges & Olkin, 1985, p. 153 
Relationship of ES to Study Design
We examined factors that might influence study outcomes: year published, sample size, type of criterion, predictors used, background of clinical judges (e.g., medical versus psychological), judges' level of experience, relative amount of data available to the clinicians versus mechanical formulas, and whether the mechanical algorithm was cross-validated. We used weighted least squares = hit rate (nearest %), corr = correlation coefficient (generally Pearson), ROC -area under Receiver Operating regression to estimate influences of study design on the ES (Hedges & Olkin, 1985) .
Publication date did not influence ESs, ((134) = 0.76, ns. There is no significant relationship between sample size and ES, ((134) = -0.15, ns, nor between source of publication (journal versus other) and ES, f(134) = 0.12, p < .91. Table 2 breaks down ESs by type of criterion. There was a trend toward greater advantage for mechanical prediction in medical and forensic settings, F(5, 130) = 2.11, p < .07. We ran a Ryan-Einot-Gabriel-Welsch multiple F follow-up test, which failed to show any significant differences, between categories. We concluded that the superiority of mechanical prediction holds across many prediction domains.
When results of an interview are used as predictive data, the ES favors the mechanical prediction more than when no interview is available [with interview, weighted M ± SD = 0.224 ± 5.06; without interview, 0.070 ± 2.29, ((134) = 5.02, p < .0001]. Use of medical data (physical examination, laboratory tests) as predictors is associated with smaller differences [with medical data, weighted M ± SD = 0.083 ± 3.00; without medical data, 0.16 ± 3.61, ((134) = 2.66, p < .009]. On the other hand, use versus nonuse of psychological tests, trait ratings, behavioral observations, and the examinee's track record (e.g., record of previous crimes used to predict recidivism) as predictors does not significantly influence the difference in accuracy between mechanical and clinical prediction.
Judges' training does not substantially influence the results. Medically trained judges (N = 27 studies) did not differ from psychologists (N = 56 studies) in how inferior they were to mechanical prediction: The weighted M ± SD for medical judges was 0.11 ± 4.93, close to the figure for psychologist judges, 0.065 ± 1.53, f(81) = 0.66, ns. Similarly, training and experience (amount of training, general experience in the field, specific task-relevant experience) do not significantly predict the degree of superiority of mechanical over clinical prediction (all t tests were nonsignificant, p > .10).
Even the comparative amount of data available to clinicians versus mechanical prediction did not significantly influence the study ES [M ± SD when clinician had more data 0.10 ± 3.88; 0.11 ± 2.19 when they had the same data, ((130) = 0.25, ns]. The mechanical-prediction formula was never based on more data than the clinician had.
3 Furthermore, whether the judges had more data or equal amounts of data relative to the mechanical formula made little difference in the relative superiority of mechanical predictions (M -.10 ± 3.88 when the clinician had more data and M -.11 ± 2.19 when the clinician had the same amount of data).
There is a potential bias in favor of mechanical prediction in studies in which mechanical-prediction formulas were not crossvalidated. However, this was not observed. The ES was not significantly larger when the mechanical prediction was crossvalidated (0.12 ± 4.56) than when it was not, 0.10 ± 2.28, ( (B4) = -0.62, ns. Note. All statistics are computed on weighted observations, with weights as explained in the text. F(5, 130) = 2.11, p < .07.
Effect of Varying Definitions of Study ES
Our definition of the study ES is somewhat elaborate and could have been done otherwise. Therefore, we reanalyzed the data in three ways. These results are given in Table 3 . The first row lists the results of our preferred ES definition. In the second row, the study ES was defined as the median of all individual ESs for a given study. The last two rows are variations on an idea: comparing the best-performing clinician, or group of clinicians, with the Inspection of Table 3 shows that it makes little difference how the effect size is defined, even in the tails of the ES distribution. We conclude that the analysis is relatively insensitive to this aspect of our method.
Conclusions and Discussion
This study confirms and greatly extends previous reports that mechanical prediction is typically as accurate or more accurate than clinical prediction. However, our results qualify overbroad statements in the literature opining that such superiority is completely uniform; it is not. In half of the studies we analyzed, the clinical method is approximately as good as mechanical prediction, and in a few scattered instances, the clinical method was notably more accurate.
Even though outlier studies can be found, we identified no systematic exceptions to the general superiority (or at least material equivalence) of mechanical prediction. It holds in general medicine, in mental health, in personality, and in education and training settings. It holds for medically trained judges and for psychologists. It holds for inexperienced and seasoned judges.
Unfortunately, we were unable to identify many study design variables that robustly predict an advantage for clinical prediction.
Only one consistent feature emerged in the eight studies in which clinical judgment outperformed mechanical prediction. In seven of the eight studies, the clinicians received more data than the mechanical prediction. (However, in the entire set of 136 studies, whether die clinician had more data did not significantly influence the relative superiority of mechanical prediction.) The only design variable that substantially influenced the relative efficacy of the mechanical-and clinical-prediction methods was whether the clinicians had access to a clinical interview. Alas, clinical predictions were outperformed by a substantially greater margin when such data was available to the clinician.
Why do we obtain these results? Humans are susceptible to many errors in clinical judgment (Garb, 1998; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) . These include ignoring base rates, assigning nonoptimal weights to cues, failure to take into account regression toward the mean, and failure to properly assess covariation. Heuristics such as representativeness (which leads to belief in the law of small numbers) or availability (leading to over-weighting vivid data) can similarly reduce clinicians' accuracy. Also, clinicians often do not receive adequate feedback on the accuracy of their judgments (Einhora & Hogarth, 1978) , which gives them scant opportunity to change maladaptive judgment habits. In this regard, it is notable that experienced psychologists frequently show little improvement in the accuracy of their clinical judgments relative to the clinical judgments of psychology graduate students (Garb, 1989 (Garb, , 1998 .
Answers, to Potential Objections
It might be objected that many of the studies are methodologically unsound. Indeed, many were not even designed specifically to test clinical against mechanical data combination. The classic criticism of meta-analyses as "garbage in, garbage out" might be brought to bear. In principle, one could answer such a criticism by
showing that better studies do not produce results much different from poorer ones, or even that the better studies allow stronger conclusions in the same direction as all the studies put together.
Unfortunately, better studies is too ambiguous a phrase to be objectively applied. Therefore, we instead examined specific study design factors that are rationally related to quality (e.g., peerreviewed journal versus chapter or dissertation, sample size, level of training and experience for judges, cross-validated versus noncross-validated statistical formulae). Essentially all of these studydesign factors failed to significantly influence study effect sizes; no such factor produced a sizable influence on study outcomes.
This being the case, our data give us no reason to suppose that methodologically weaker studies yield different results from better studies. Arguments to the contrary would need to be substantiated by new studies with methods inarguably better than those we have reviewed. The minimal effect of most of the study design factors provides no support for Holt's (1970) contention that the superiority of the mechanical-prediction method is reflective of studydesign factors that may bias the results in favor of mechanical predictions. For instance, mechanical predictions outperformed both expert and novice judges. The effect is also clearly not limited the prediction of purely quantitative data. In fact, inclusion of nonquantitative data such as clinical interviews accentuates the superiority of mechanical predictions. Similar conclusions arise if the criterion for considering one method superior to the other are made more lenient (i.e., smaller ES) or more stringent (i.e., larger ES). The trend in our data is so strong that we conjecture the following: There is no selection of studies, based on anything except study outcome itself, that will yield a conclusion directly contrary to ours. Does our more novel finding, that clinical prediction is often as good as mechanical prediction, matter for any practical purpose? Historically, many advocates of mechanical prediction have assumed that the (near-) equality of mechanical and clinical predictions' performances could be counted as a win for mechanical prediction. The rationale for this position has not always been made explicit, but one reason put forth is cost: Mechanical prediction is supposedly much cheaper. No expensive team meetings of high paid professionals are held; a clerk, or a computer program, can make the prediction for a pittance. Hence, our near-equality results should arguably be counted as a real superiority for mechanical predictions.
One potential problem with this position lies in its failure to distinguish various costs. Costs in decision theory include the cost of acquiring information needed to make a decision (whether via clinical or mechanical data combination), the cost of making the decision (here, combining the data), and the costs of the various errors that might be made. Either the data-gathering cost, or the cost of errors, could wash out the advantage of cheaper data combination.
However, data-gathering costs also tend to favor mechanical prediction. In most studies we found, the mechanical-prediction rule operated on fewer data. For example, using a two-variable regression equation (grade point average and college board exam score), Sarbin (1942) could out-predict guidance counselors, who had to obtain and look at personal statements, interest inventories, and letters of recommendation. Moreover, it has not been demonstrated that the costs associated with mechanical-prediction errors are greater than those for clinical prediction. A full analysis of this problem would require thorough examination of relative costs (e.g., false positive determinations of likely criminal recidivism versus false negatives). Studies like this have apparently not been conducted. Future research might profitably address such issues. Perhaps the accuracy of mechanical prediction, appropriately weighted by the costs of its errors, really is less than that of clinical prediction.
Although we cannot rule this possibility out, it is fair to say that the ball is in the clinicians' court. Given the overall deficit in clinicians' accuracy relative to mechanical prediction, the burden falls on advocates of clinical prediction to show that clinicians' predictions are more beneficial to clients in terms of cost-weighted errors, overall costs of decision making, or both.
On the other hand, the assumption that mechanical prediction is always cheaper is simply false. A few years ago WMG watched a highly seasoned MMPI interpreter clinically interpret a number of MMPIs. He wrote his interpretations out much faster than WMG could look up the actuarial data in Marks and Seeman's (1963) actuarial MMPI interpretation guide. In fact, given his billing rates, he was less expensive as an MMPI interpreter than the Minnesota Report, a mechanical interpretation scheme implemented as a computerized expert system.
Although this example may not be typical, it does demonstrate that one cannot simply assume that mechanical prediction is always cheaper. We would, however, be quite surprised if the general run of costs did not favor mechanical prediction. Because many clinical decisions are made not by one clinician but by teams or committees, their costs are often considerably larger than any reasonable estimate of the cost of mechanical prediction. Moreover, unlike the Minnesota Report, most actuarial or statistical data-combination procedures are not proprietary and do not have an appreciable cost per case, after initial setup (on the other hand, freely distributed statistical formulas do not generate revenue that can be put back into research designed to improve the prediction scheme).
On balance, the basic assumption that mechanical prediction is cheapest, and hence to be preferred when it and clinical prediction perform about equally well, seems sound even though there are counterexamples to be found. There seem, then, to be no barriers to a general preference for mechanical prediction where an appropriate mechanical algorithm is available.
